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Politics After Seattle: Dilemmas of
the Anti-Globalisation Movement
Roland Bleiker
1 Introduction1
2 "It was just like May 1968," said José Bové, sheep-farmer and French anti-globalisation
hero, about the events in Seattle of December 19992 four days of massive street protests
against  the  World  Trade  Organisation  (WTO)  turned  the  city  into  a  battle  ground  -
literally and metaphorically. Bové joined some 700 nongovernmental organisations and
an  estimated  40,000  demonstrators,  including  steelworkers,  environmentalists,  AIDS-
activists, farmers, anti-capitalists, anarchists, students and concerned local citizens. What
began as a peaceful  protest  march ended in a violent confrontation with the Seattle
police. The authorities called in the National Guard and declared a state of emergency.
Global television networks were delivering hourly updates on the situation, turning the
protests into a major media event. 
3 For some,  the Battle for Seattle was a "turning point,"3an event that  symbolised the
world's  discontent  with the spread of  globalisation,  with policies  that  promoted free
trade and corporate greed over the interests of average people and the environment.4
Others stress that Seattle "was the first time that the political presence of a range of new
actors was taken seriously."5 Similar interventions and protests, some nonviolent, others
less so, followed in the subsequent months : thousands of demonstrators interfered with
gatherings of the World Economic Forum in Melbourne and Davos, or with meetings of
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank in Washington and Prague.
Indeed,  major popular protests against  international  political  and economic meetings
soon  became  a  common  feature  of  key  political  meetings,  from  Quebec  Summit
Discussions on Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (April 2001) to the European Union
gathering in Gothenburg (June 2001) and the G8 summit in Genoa (July 2001). All this is
taking  place  in  the  wake  of  several  years  of  less  visible  but  nevertheless  sustained
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protests in many parts of the developing world, from Argentina to Zambia, against the
severe social consequences of IMF-imposed structural adjustment programs. 
4 This world-wide wave of popular dissent expresses more than mere discontent with the
effects  of  globalisation.  The  fact  that  countless  people  around  the  globe  see  street
protests as the only means to voice their opinions symbolises a much more systemic and
alarming  crisis  of  legitimacy,  one  that  has  to  do  with  the  lack  of  democratic
accountability of the major multilateral institutions that shape the world economy. In
some  sense  the  events  of  Seattle  highlight  what  Joan  Bondurant  already  identified
decades  ago  as  a  key  weakness  of  liberal  thought,  namely  « the  failure  to  provide
techniques  of  action  for  those  critical  occasions  when  the  machinery  of  democratic
government no longer functions to resolve large-scale, overt conflict. »6
5 The purpose of this essay is to engage some of the political dilemmas that surround the
changing nature of activism. To do so, the essay portrays globalisation as a multiple and
at times contradictory process : not only as a disempowering encroachment of large and
unaccountable economic structures, but also as an evolution that has opened up new
possibilities for popular participation in the struggle over global politics and governance.
Acts  of  protest  are no longer limited by their  immediate spatial  environment.  If  the
dissident event is picked up by global media networks it has the potential to transgress
the streets of Seattle, Washington, Melbourne or Prague. Protests then acquire an almost
immediate transnational dimension. They interfere with the struggle over values that
ultimately shapes the world we live in. 
6 Popular dissent has clearly become a key feature of global politics. But while the nature of
these  transformations  has  been discussed  in  some detail,7 the  ensuing  dilemmas  for
activists  remain  much  less  explored.  Clearly,  an  increase  in  political  visibility  and
political influence also calls for additional moral responsibility, or so at least it should.
Among the many political challenges that the new breed of diverse global activists face,
and that this essay discusses, are the choice between violent and nonviolent means of
protest and the struggle over voice and representation, the question of who can speak for
whom. An extensive and broadly conceived engagement with these challenges is crucial if
the global dissident movement is to contribute to the construction of a better world,
rather than merely oppose existing policies. 
 
Globalisation and its Discontents 
7 Before probing the political dilemmas of global activism, a brief inquiry into the nature of
globalisation is necessary. Given the existence of a vast literature on the subject,8 such an
endeavour can only illuminate a few select aspects. A more limited focus on issues of
dissent and agency is thus in order for this essay. Of particular relevance here is Paul
Virilio, who a quarter of a century ago already noted that the contraction of distances
had become a strategic reality.9 Virilio, like man other commentators, believes that the
world is undergoing significant change. This change, he argues, revolves around the use
and regulation of speed. 
8 Speed is an important aspect of globalisation, albeit, of course, not the only one. Speed
signifies the relationship between various phenomena, notably space and time. Space has
become annihilated, Virilio claims, and time has taken over as the criterion around which
global dynamics revolve. The instantaneous character of communication and mass media
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has annihilated duration and locality. The « now » of the emission is privileged to the
detriment of the « here, » the space where things take place. What matters are no longer
the three spatial dimensions of height, depth, and width, but above all a fourth one, time.
10 Virilio predicts that the globe will no longer primarily be divided spatially into North
and South, but temporally into two forms of speed, absolute and relative. The « haves »
and « have-nots » are then sorted out between those who live in the hyperreal shrunken
world of instant communication, cyberdynamics, and electronic money transactions - and
those, more disadvantaged than ever, who live in the real space of local villages, cut off
from the temporal forces that drive politics and economics.11 Expressed in other words,
inequality will increasingly defy the spatial dimensions of political life. One can frolic in
the virtual world of speed and enjoy its privileges from virtually anywhere on the planet.
A person with access to a computer, modem and phone line in, say, rural Lesotho or Tibet,
can be as much part of global dynamics than a corporate executive in New York's World
Trade  Centre.  On the  other  hand,  one  can be  situated  in  the  middle  of  the  world's
metropolitan cores,  say, in Los Angeles,  Paris or Tokyo, and miss out entirely on the
revolution of speed. 
9 The consequences of unequal access to the world of speed goes beyond the creation of
material and social inequalities.  The most fatal disparities may well  emerge from the
creation of two different mindsets and the types of privileges they engender. Those who
operate in the cyberworld of speed will gradually acquire different thinking patterns. The
dictates of linear thought,  imposed by the representational limits of books and other
printed  materials,  are  gradually  giving  way  to  a  more  interconnected  system  of
communication. New informational sources, such as CD-Rom and the World Wide Web,
have already created logics of representation that defy linearity and, instead, provide the
reader with a multitude of access points and connections between them. Fluency in the
ensuing types of thinking patterns will  increasingly dominate access to privilege and
basic necessities, from job opportunities to information sources. People trained in and
accustomed to linear thinking are likely to become more and more marginal, being cut of
from the  new informational  dynamics  that  are  bound to  drive  societies  in  the  new
millennium.12
10 It is not surprising, then, that voices of concern have become more vocal. We hear of a
nation state that is no longer able to uphold its sovereignty and the spheres of justice and
civility  that  the  corresponding  boundaries  were  supposed  to  protect.  We  witness  a
decline in state responsibility for social affairs, which has either been relegated to the
nongovernmental sector or simply left to market dynamics.  But the latter,  of course,
operate  along  principles  other  than  those  necessary  for  the  establishment  of  social
justice. Decades after decolonisation was introduced in most parts of the world the gap
between rich and poor has widened substantially. A recent report by the United Nations
Development  Program,  for  instance,  informs  us  that  the  assets  of  the  world's  three
richest people amount to more than the combined GNP of all least developed countries on
the  planet.13 Disempowerment  and  disentitlement  have  become  key  features  of
globalisation. We hear of neo-liberal world order that is 
11 increasingly  run  by  a  few  powerful  multilateral  institutions  and  multinational
corporations  -  big  unaccountable  structures  whose  strategic  leitmotifs  and  decision
making principles reflect the imperatives of short-term material objectives, rather than
the more widely sketched principles that may well be necessary for the protection of
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average people and the survival of a global ecosystem that is becoming more and more
stretched. 
 
Activism Against International Economic Institutions 
12 The existence and exact significance of these and many other aspects of globalisation can
be debated at length. There are other accounts of globalisation, of course, which view
economic and social processes from more positive and altogether different angles. Far
less disputable is the fact that the above-described phenomena are among a range of
issues, diverse and subjectively perceived as they may be, that worry a great number of
people around the globe. Consider the participants in the Seattle protests : they arrived
from many parts of the world and represented a multitude of different interests, from
labour to the environment. Their voices ranged from radical anarchists who sought to
abolish the WTO to more moderate reformers who argued for a world economic system
that is fairer and more democratic. 
13 The main common target of the diversely motivated protest actions in Seattle, Prague and
other cities are the three key institutions of the liberal world economy : the World Bank,
the IMF and the WTO. Some protesters lament the lack of democratic accountability that
characterises these influential organisations. Kelly Quirk, head of the Rainforest Action
Network, worries that "the WTO has the right to completely rescind any law passed by
the citizenry to protect the environment, health and labour rights."14 Other critics focus
more generally on the neo-liberal agenda that is promoted by the respective economic
institutions. They stress that the ensuing global free-trade regime is sacrificing the poor
and  the  environment  in  favour  of  the  short-term  dictates  of  profit-seeking  capital.
Vandana Shiva, for instance, is convinced that the WTO is enforcing "anti-people, anti-
nature decision to enable corporations to steal the world's harvests through secretive,
undemocratic  structures  and  processes."15 Many  agree,  even  the  less  radical  critics,
pointing towards a variety of WTO decisions that favoured commercial interests over, for
instance, the protection of dolphins and turtles. Or they emphasise that the so-called
non-tariff  trade  barriers,  which the  WTO seeks  to  eliminate,  are  actually  "hard-won
environmental  and  food  safety  protections."16 Others  draw  attention  to  the  many
gendered effects of IMF interventions in the developing world. Women often bear the
ensuing  costs,  as  in  the  case  of  reduced expenditures  on social  services,  which  is  a
common element of privatisation and fiscal austerity policies that accompany structural
adjustment programs.17 Others again stress that structural adjustment programs not only
leave  little  policy  options  for  nation-states,  but  also  fail  to  address  the  root  of  the
problem - seen as the enduring crisis of productivity of capital in industrialised countries.
18
14 It is not the purpose of this essay to discuss and evaluate these and many other criticism
that have been directed against the WTO, the IMF and the World Bank. Rather, the essay
scrutinises some of the political dilemmas related to the process through which these
grievances are expressed.  And here the issue of  globalisation is  pivotal.  Indeed,  it  is
perhaps  the  only  rallying-point  that  unites  all  the  various  and  diversely  motivated
protesters.  They  all  oppose  something  called  globalisation.  "I  don't  like  the  word
globalisation," says one activist. "It signifies something inevitable, ineluctable."19 To be
more precise, the problem is not globalisation as such, for it is hardly possible to turn
back the clock of technological progress and neutralise the multitude of forces that are
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currently transforming the world. What many activists oppose is a particular approach to
globalisation :  the  prevalent,  neo-liberal  version  of  international  economics  and  the
ensuing belief in "the inexorable irreversibility of free-market globalisation."20 This is
why they stress that globalisation is not an inevitable phenomena, but a constructed
narrative, "a political project which can be responded to politically."21
15 How successful,  then,  have the protesters  of  Seattle  been in diverting the seemingly
unstoppable  course  of  neo-liberal  international  economics ?  How  close  are  we  to
globalisation with a human face ? 
16 Evaluating the impact of global activism is no easy task, and I do not pretend to present,
in the space of an essay-length exposé,  evidence that can point conclusively towards
success  or  failure.  There  are,  however,  a  number  of  extensive  studies  that  provide
relevant insight. Among them is an impressive monograph that examines the relationship
between social movements and international economic institutions. The authors, Robert
O'Brien and three collaborators, examine the extent to which social movement pressure
has resulted in institutional change and policy modification.22 The book's core consists of
four detailed case studies. They focus on the influence of the environmental, the labour
and the women's movement on the World Bank, the IMF and the WTO. The authors find
sufficient evidence to conclude that multilateral institutions have embarked on a process
of  engagement,  mutual  learning  and  exchange  of  information.  All  three  economic
institutions have developed mechanisms to improve their relationships with NGOs. But
while showing increased willingness to listen, the institutions have so far been reluctant
to grant NGOs formal representational rights and access to the decision making process.
As a result, O'Brien and his collaborators believe that in the short run the impact of global
social movement "is unlikely to transform institutional functions."23 Since their study was
finished just before the protests against the WTO meeting in Seattle of December 1999, a
slightly more optimistic evaluation may be in order from today's vantage point. 
17 Several commentators do, indeed, point towards a limited series of 'successes' reached by
the recent wave of global activism. There is the fact that both the WTO negotiation round
in Seattle and the annual World Bank / IMF meeting in Prague finished a day earlier,
although the respective organisations claim that this change in schedule had nothing to
do  with  the  voices  of  protest  that  interfered  -  at  times  audibly  -  with  the  formal
deliberation of the decision makers. Some commentators point out that the very presence
of radical and violent protesters has provided the moderate, reform-oriented NGOs with
unprecedented access to the inner sanctum of the IMF and the World Bank. "There is
nothing like being besieged by a group of rioters armed with Molotov cocktails to make
your old enemies suddenly look appealing," says one journalist.24 Others stress how the
pressure from the street was instrumental in reinforcing some 40 developing countries
who,  during  the  Seattle  WTO negotiations,  argued  that  they  were  marginalized  and
bullied by an organisation that  is  dominated by rich countries  protecting their  own
trading interests. "An unprecedented rebellion was in the offing," said one commentator.
"For the first time in history the poor countries of the world had told the rich they
weren't playing the First Worlds' game."25 A similar pattern occurred during the World
Economic  Forum in Davos  in  January  2001.  Representative  of  Third World  Countries
continued  their  criticism  and  an  unprecedented  number  of  NGOs  were  invited  to
participate in the program. And while police action outside kept popular protests in the
streets of Davos to a minimum, the UN General Secretary, Kofi Annan, declared renewed
commitment  towards  reaching  a  so-called  "Global  Compact"  -  a  project  designed  to
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monitor the performance of  major companies  with regard to human rights,  working
conditions and environmental protection.26
18 Pressure from civil society has lead to more transparency and accountability within the
IMF, WTO and the World Bank. But one can argue about the adequacy or significance of
these changes. The fundamental leitmotifs of the key multilateral economic institutions
has  not  changed.  Structural  adjustment  programs  are  still  intact  and  neo-liberalism
remains  the  modus  operandi,  and  the  underlying  ideology,  of  global  economic
governance.  There  is  no  new  legislation  that  protects  the  victims  of  globalisation :
Annan's Global Compact is far from secured. Where, then, are the traces of Seattle ? 
 
Speed and Dissident Agency 
19 To understand the long-term effects of global activism it is necessary to approach the
process of globalisation in a more nuanced way. Contrary to the positions advocated by or
implied in the Seattle protests, globalisation does not necessarily, or at least not only,
lead to a centralisation of power and a corresponding loss of democratic participation and
political accountability. While these phenomena are undoubtedly occurring - and pose
increasingly difficult ethical and political challenges to the world community - they are
not  the  only  aspects  of  globalisation.  A  focus  on  speed  allows  us  to  recognise  the
contradictory forces of globalisation, the manner in which its whirlwinds push and pull
politics, form the local to the global, in a variety of directions. 
20 Globalisation has not annihilated dissent. Quite to the contrary. There are at least two
domains in which speed has magnified the possibilities for interfering with the conduct of
global politics. 
21 First, speed provides activists with a range of new tools to organise and co-ordinate their
actions. Many of the protesters that went to Seattle, Melbourne and Prague, for instance,
were  brought  together  by  e-mail  correspondences  and  a  variety  of  web-sites  that
organised resistance against neo-liberal forms of globalisation. The increased ability to
exchange information across large differences has had a tremendous influence on the
mobilisation of dissent within civil society. Social movements and NGOs that had hitherto
existed in isolation can now easily communicate with each other. They can share data and
insights  about  similar  concerns  and organise  common actions  in  ways  that  was  not
possible  before.27 A  study  on  citizen  activism against  the  Multilateral  Agreement  on
Investment  (MAI),  for  instance,  suggests  that  the  Internet  played a  vital  role  in  the
relative success of the movement - the MAI was at least temporarily pushed off the OECD
agenda. The Internet was central to the camping insofar as it facilitated communication
among  activists,  permitted  publication  of  a  related  information  and  helped  to  put
pressure  on  politicians  and  policy-makers  in  member  states.28 Cyber-based  protest
organisation has become more extensive and sophisticated as activists have learned from
previous  experiences.  The  protests  in  Quebec  City,  for  instance,  have  given  raise  to
numerous  web-sites  that  exchange  information  and  coordinate  future  actions.29 Not
surprisingly, this move into cyberspace takes place at both sides of the struggle.  The
World Bank, for instance, has started plans for a major online conference in order to
avoid another round of public protests.30
22 Second,  and  perhaps  even  more  importantly,  speed  has  fundamentally  changed  the
spatial dynamics of dissident practices. Protest actions, such as street demonstrations or
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acts of civil disobedience, used to take place in a mostly local context. They engaged the
spatial dynamics that were operative in the interactive relationship between ruler and
ruler. The contraction of space, however, has altered the very foundations of these socio-
political dynamics. An act of protest, as it took place in Seattle, now interacts in a much
wider and more complex array of political spaces. Images of a protest march may flicker
over television screens world-wide only hours after people have taken to the street. As a
result,  a local act of resistance can acquire almost immediately a much larger, cross-
territorial dimension. 
23 Any protest action that draws sufficient media attention has the potential to engender a
political process that transcends its immediate spatial environment. It competes for the
attention of global television audiences and thus interferes with the struggle over values
that ultimately shapes the world we live in. "A world united by Benetton slogans, Nike
sweatshops  and McDonald's  jobs  might  not  be  anyone's  utopian global  village,"  says
Naomi Klein, "but its fibre-optic cables and shared cultural references are nonetheless
laying the foundations  for  the first  truly  international  people's  movement.31 But  the
recent wave of global protests is hardly the first international movement of its kind. Nor
is it as unproblematic as Klein suggests. For some the revolution of speed is too random to
allow  for  critical  interference  and,  indeed,  for  human  agency.  Jean  Baudrillard,  for
instance, believes that the distinctions between reality and virtuality, political practice
and simulation are blurred to the extent that they are no longer recognisable.32 Our
media  culture,  he  says,  has  annihilated  reality  in  stages,  such  that  in  the  end  its
simulating  image  « bears  no  relation  to  any  reality  whatever :  it  is  its  own  pure
simulacrum. »  Television,  the  unproblematic  transmission  of  the  hyperreal,  has
conditioned  our  mind  such  that  we  have  lost  the  ability  to  penetrate  beneath  the
manifest levels of surface.33
24 Patterns of  global  protest  do not  confirm the pessimistic  views that  Baudrillard and
others espouse. The blurring of reality and virtuality has not annihilated dissent. The fact
that  televised  images  are  hyperreal  does  not  necessarily  diminish  their  influence.
Independently of how instantaneous, distorted and simulated images of a protest action
may be, they still influence our perceptions of issues, and thus also our political responses
to them. To accept the logic of speed, then, is not to render political influence obsolete,
but to acknowledge multiple and overlapping spatial and temporal spheres within which
political practices are constantly being shaped and reshaped. 
25 Judged from such a vantage-point, the actions in Seattle and other cities are not quite as
ineffective  as  they  appear  at  first  sight.  Even  without  engendering  immediate
institutional transformations, traces of these protest events continue to influence the
struggle  over  global  values  -  and  thus  over  the  direction  of  politics.  The  repeated
presence of protest actions around the world guarantees that a number of key issues,
from environmental  protection to minimal labour standards,  remain discussed in the
public  sphere.  Indeed,  even before Seattle,  O'Brien and his  collaborators had already
concluded that  the  interaction between social  movements  and multilateral  economic
institutions has transformed the nature of global economic governance. The authors label
this transformation "complex multilateralism" in order to recognise that actors other
than states now can and do express the public interest and shape issues of governance.34
The ensuing dynamics testify for the emergence of a new kind of global politics - one in
which key political struggles occur beyond the control of the national state. Consider, for
instance, how global networks of communication have enabled indigenous peoples in the
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United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand to engage in forms of activism that
ensured them an audience beyond their immediate surroundings. For William Connelly,
this tendency confirms that speed has multiple dimensions : not only the encroaching
and disabling one that Baudrillard (and to some extent Virilio) argue, but also one that
"supports the possibility of democratic pluralization."35 Some even think ahead towards a
time in which we can speak of unconditional universal hospitality - a situation in which
rights and responsibilities would no longer be circumscribed by the spatial and political
logic of national sovereignty.36
26 But  the  increased  ability  to  influence  the  course  of  events  also  carries  certain
responsibilities. And it engenders a new set of challenges : How is one to move from a
mere protest movement to the task of constructing a more just and viable world order ?
Who decides about the desirable course of action, the direction of protest, the means that
are appropriate  and the ends that  are desirable ?  How is  one to maintain a  level  of
solidarity or common interest in a vast array of diverging and competing interests ? 
 
Who Speaks for Whom ? The Problem of
Representation 
27 At first sight, the demands of the protesters seem clear and unequivocal. A participant in
the Prague demonstrations puts  it  this  way :  "To advance the citizen's  control  [over
globalisation]."37 But this is where the consensus ends and where difficulties begin. As
mentioned at various points in this essay, the people that participated in the protest
actions in Prague and other cities represented a great variety of different and at times
conflicting  interests  and  constituencies,  from  steelworkers  to  feminist  and
environmentalists. They ranged from radical anarchists to moderate reformers. "There
was a cacophony of voices and issues," say Margaret Levi and David Olson about Seattle.38
And  once  these  voices  were  picked  up  by  global  television  networks,  they  became
intertwined with an infinitely more diverse and random array of voices and images, all
flickering and babbling away without much form or direction. 
28 Media representations follow their own logic - different from the logic of the events they
seek to capture - blending information and entertainment in often highly problematic
ways. Indeed, information is often a secondary issue : "The entire script content of the
CBS nightly half-hour news," Michael Ignatieff reminds us, "would fit on three-quarters
of the front page of the New York Times.39 This is one of the reasons why Virilio believes
that "the paradoxical logic of the video-frame privileges the accident, the surprise, over
the durable substance of the message."40 It also privileges a specific key target audience :
the television viewers of the Western World, those with the spending power to sustain
the networks' advertisement rates and corporate profits. It is hardly surprising, then,
that  not  all  forms  of  protest  receive  the  same  level  of  media  attention.  There  is  a
significant different between coverage of activism in developed and developing countries.
29 For  decades,  sustained  popular  protests  against  the  key  multilateral  economic
institutions have taken place in many parts of the Third World. Countless IMF-sponsored
structural adjustment program have triggered sustained protest reactions by the local
populace. These protests have increased in recent years. One can find many examples for
the year 2000 alone : twenty million Indian workers went on strike to oppose IMF and
World  Bank  policies ;  some  five  thousand  students,  environmentalists  and  displaced
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people  overwhelmed  police  lines  protecting  an  Asian  Development  Bank  meeting  in
Chiang  Mai ;  small  anti-IMF protests  in  Argentina  were  dispersed  by  the  police,  but
precipitated a mass protest of 80,000 people ; tens of thousands of Korean workers and
students  repeatedly  took  to  the  streets  to  protest  against  IMF-mandated  austerity
measures.  The list  could go on,  and would also  include protests  in  Bolivia,  Ecuador,
Paraguay, Mexico, Brazil, Columbia, Costa Rica, Honduras, Haiti, South Africa, Nigeria,
Kenya, Malawi and Zambia, to name just a few counties, and only for protest during the
year 2000.41
30 Wide-spread and massive as these protests were, they received relatively little coverage
in the global print and television media. Most of these uprisings warranted barely a line,
or none at all, in the New York Times, Le Mondeor the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. They
rarely make the BBC or  the CNN World  News.  The Battle  for  Seattle,  by contrast,  was
located at the heart of the industrialised world, and thus immediately turned into a global
media spectacle. 
31 A single molotov cocktail  in Seattle,  Washington or Quebec is  worth far more media
capital than an entire protest march in Cochabamba, Lagos or Port-au-Prince. Twenty
million Indian workers  on strike  or  80,000  Argentineans  descending into  the  streets
generate far  less  global  attention than two dozen protesters  in Davos,  Melbourne or
Gothenburg.  Southern social  movements clearly operate not  only in a  different  local
environment, but also according to very different rules of power.42 But what does this say
about the dynamic of protest ? About the struggle for voice and representation ? 
32 One  of  the  main  criticism  against  the  protests  in  Prague  and  Seattle  was  that  the
protesters were predominantly from the West and thus represented a very particular,
often  white  and  middle-class  perspective.  Here  too,  one  could  go  on  debating  the
provenance and motivations of the protestors. They certainly were not all rich and not all
Westerners. But in most protest actions the Third World was clearly underrepresented.
Significant political implications result. Some go as far as arguing that the new wave of
global  activism runs  the  risk  of  reproducing  the  very  same  neo-liberal  practices  of
exclusion it so strongly opposes.43 It is questionable, for instance, to what extent the calls
for higher labour and environmental standards, which was a central demand of most
protest actions, is actually shared in the Third World. Many developing countries face the
challenge  to  promote  basic  economic  growth  and  may  not  be  able  afford  the  same
environmental standards that are now established in the developed world. Indeed, some
representatives of the Third World in Seattle argued that the US government was able to
use the protest as a convenient pretext to break off discussions on trade issues, for a
successful WTO negotiation round could have brought certain benefits to the developing
world and undermined the traditional support base of the Democratic Party.44
33 Such quarrels over the meaning and direction of the protest movement illustrate how the
struggle over legitimate representation is one of the most pivotal political challenges
faced by global protests movements. Indeed, representation is, as Ankersmit stresses, at
the hart  of  politics.45 But how is  one to establish appropriate standards and rules of
enforcement for a protest movement that is all about defying conventional mechanisms
and boundaries of politics ? 
34 The most accepted standards of legitimate representation are democratic principles. The
political legitimatisation process in the modern state is largely built  around electoral
accountability and the various legal and institutional frameworks that surround it. But
democratic principles cannot easily be applied to transnational protest movements and
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their engagement with multilateral institutions. Democracy, as we know it, is intrinsically
linked to the territorial boundaries of the nation state and its key political institutions.
William Connolly correctly notes that "it is probably impossible even to imagine a form of
democratic  politics  today  that  breaks  entirely  with this  model  [of  the  territorial
imaginary]."46 But  Connolly  also  recognises  the  rapidly  changing  dynamics  of
globalisation,  the  fact  that  virtually  all  aspects  of  life  transgress  the  boundaries  of
sovereign states, from the flow of capital and labour to criminal organisations, media
networks and protest movements. "Only democratic citizens," he stresses, "remain locked
behind the bars of the state."47
35 The challenge, then, consists of finding a way of extending democratic accountability to
the struggle over the direction of global governance and the various political, social and
economic dynamics associated with it. While such a project may well be impossible to
imagine today, Connelly points in a promising direction. He approaches democracy not
only as a set of political institutions, but also, and perhaps even primarily, as an ethos, a
cultural  disposition.  This  ethos,  Connolly  stresses,  needs  to  "foster  a  recurrent
problematization of  final  markers" -  foundational  norms which continue to reinstate
themselves.48 In the context of the struggle over global governance, such a democratic
approach would entail regular public scrutiny and discussion of how norms, values and
institutions  function.  Necessary  as  well  would  be  a  more  generic  promotion  of
transparency and an awareness of  the political  dimensions of representation,  that is,
sensitivity to who or what is excluded and included, and why. 
36 In some ways, the activists in Seattle can only speak for themselves. But this does not
mean that  they cannot  engage political  problems and criticise,  say,  issues  related to
economic governance or North-South relations. In fact, the process of convincing others
across political, cultural and linguistic divides is the very subject of politics. Indeed, the
most effective target of activism in the information age may well be the people with the
spending power to influence politics. Comfortably installed in front of their television
sets, this target audience does not usually suffer from unequal globalisation. In fact, they
are the ones who profit from existing political dynamics.49 By questioning political, social
and economic privileges,  and by disturbing the stable foundations upon which these
privileges rest, the protest movement is able to contribute to a democratisation of global
governance, even if it cannot always perfectly represent all people affected by unequal
globalisation processes. 
 
The Importance of Form : Violent versus Nonviolent
Protests 
37 The form and method of representation can be as significant as its content. The protest
events in Seattle, Washington, Prague, Melbourne, Quebec, Gothenburg, Davos and Genoa
are good examples. Without doing injustice to the uniqueness and complexities of each
event,  it  is  fair  to  say  that  most  of  them  proceeded  in  a  comparable  way :  the
overwhelming majority of protesters engaged in a variety of peaceful and nonviolent
forms of protest,  while a small minority committed acts of violence.50 At times, as in
Seattle, molotov cocktails and battles with riot police led to looting and the destruction of
property. Media attention, in turn, focused often on these violent incidents, leading to a
relatively uneven representation of the overall protests. The latter, violent episodes have
attracted by far  the most  media attention,  overshadowing both the substance of  the
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protests  and  the  presence  of  an  overwhelmingly  violent  majority  of  dissidents.  The
violent nature of recent protests against globalisation pose a number of key questions for
both social movement agency and politics in general. What is the exact nature and impact
of violence ? To what extent can violence be justified as an act of dissent ? Is violence an
effective way of promoting social  change ? How can peaceful activists who engage in
nonviolent protests or civil disobedience co-exist with those who advocate violence as a
revolutionary  strategy ?  Do  they  belong  to  the  same  movement ?  Do  their  different
engagements reinforce or hinder each other ? 
38 To  engage  these  difficult  questions  it  is  necessary  to  enter  terrains  that  are  both
analytical and normative. Consider one of the organisers of the Prague protests, a young
Czech chemistry student. In principle she is against the use of violence, but believes that
"at times it is nevertheless legitimate." When talking about the actions in Prague, she
insist on drawing a distinction between different forms of violence : "Violence committed
by  demonstrators  against  objects ;  violence  committed  by  the  police  against
demonstrators, and, worst of all, violence committed by institutions like the IMF and the
World Bank that rob millions of people of their livelihood."51 She is not alone in drawing
such  a  distinction.  "They  are worried  about  a few windows  being  smashed,"  said  a
Philippino participant in the Seattle protests. "They should come and see the violence
being done to our communities in the name of liberalization of trade."52
39 The debate between violent and nonviolent forms of protest is, of course, not new. Frantz
Fanon had already argued that violence is inevitable if existing structures of power - as
those of colonialism - are being challenged and overthrown.53 It is an integral part of
social change. Others disagree. They advocate nonviolent forms of dissent, basing their
positions on a long tradition of thought and activism that stretches back to the words and
deeds of Henry David Thoreau, Leo Tolstoy, Mohandas Gandhi and Martin Luther King, to
name just a few key figures.54 They consciously employ nonviolent forms of protest when
the  official  channels  for  political  action,  such  as  elections,  referenda,  petitions  or
lobbying do not exist or are considered inadequate for the resolution of the conflict in
question.  Nonviolent action thus seeks to empower those who do not have access to
conventional  forms  of  political  influence.  While  such  actions  usually  occur  only  in
desperate  circumstances,  they  are  not  necessarily  manifestation of  powerlessness,  as
Jonathan Freedland suggested with respect to the events in Seattle.55
40 Nonviolent dissent can also be seen as an effective resistance strategy in itself. Indeed,
the choice of nonviolent over violent protest is considered not only a moral, but also a
strategic decision - a decision for the more sound and efficient form of struggle. Richard
Gregg, in a classical study on the subject,  suggests that nonviolence works by way of
producing a change of mental attitude in the mind of those against whom the action is
directed. Nonviolent action thus works not unlike military strategies, for it seeks to « to
demoralize the opponent, to break his will, to destroy his confidence, enthusiasm and
hope. »56 But instead of using violence to counter violence, which would only drain the
resisters' energy and reassure the attacker about the adequacy of the chosen method of
repression,  nonviolence  is  considered  to  be  a  more  effective  form  of  political
intervention.  Some  recent  studies  have  found  mixed  evidence  about  the  ability  of
nonviolent  action  to  change  the  position  of  its  opponents.  Instead,  they  stress  that
nonviolence can engender social change by influencing third parties.57
41 This is where the debate over the politics of protest actions becomes explicitly strategic
and tactical. The issues at stake are well illustrated by how activists differ about the point
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at which an action does and perhaps should become violent. Some non-violent activists
reserve the right to employ violent means for reasons of self-defence. They argue that
they have a moral right to self-protection, perhaps even to physical responses, if attacked
by  the  police.58 Others  disagree.  They  advocate  a  more  principled  adherence  to
nonviolence, and this for ethical and, above all, for strategic and tactical reasons. The
classical  example  here  is  Gandhi,  who  urged  his  fellow activists  to  adhere  to  strict
principles of nonviolence. He called off a protest march as soon as the slightest acts of
violence were committed by activists. For him this was necessary because the power of
nonviolence is located in its manipulative potential, in its ability to convert the opponent
or third parties. Nonviolence, then, is seen as a psychological weapon, an intervention
that causes emotional and moral perturbations which in turn trigger processes of social
change. It seeks a conversation with the consciousness of the opponent and the public at
large.  Violent  acts  of  protest  generally  fail  to  reach  this  objective,  Gandhi  argued.
Principled nonviolence, by contrast, can be an exceptionally effective means. Recall the
moment when Gandian activist were beaten by the police without attempting any form of
retaliation. It remains one of the most striking and powerful images of the resistance
movement against Britain's colonial occupation of India. Striking because these images
capture  an  ethical  and  political  commitment  that  can  hardly  be  matched.  Powerful
because they manage to initiate forces of transformation that violent acts never can :
they evoke pity  which,  in  turn,  can either  convert  the  opponent  or  generate  public
pressure that can lead to a process of accommodation.59 A similar position has recently
been advanced by Amartya Sen, who argued that the ant-globalisation protest would be
fare more effective if it were to employ not violence, but humour as a strategy of dissent
and transformation.60
42 The verdict of Seattle on the issue of violence and nonviolence is mixed. On the one hand,
violence attracts  fare  more media  attention than nonviolence does.  In  a  world were
entertainment and information are intrinsically linked, a molotov cocktail or a street
fight between protesters and police offers far more spectacular and attractive 'news'
material than does a peaceful protest march. On the other hand, this media attention is
gained at a certain price. Recall that the main purpose of the protest, and of the ensuing
media spectacle, was to draw attention to the undersides of globalisation and to win the
hearts and minds of global television audiences. This is where the dissident event could
leave its most enduring impact on the policy debates that surround globalisation. The fact
that  the evens  in  Seattle  turned  violent,  however,  gave  critics  an  easy  target :  the
protesters  could now be dismissed as  disgruntled youths or demonised as  dangerous
anarchist radicals who are not in tune with the needs and wishes of the general populace.
61 This is why some commentators were able to speak dismissively of a "counter-culture
carnival,"62 of the "globetrotting anti-globalisation mob,"63 of "hippies and yippies" with
their "bedraggled beards and their mobiles phones hooked up to the internet."64 It is also
unlikely  that  violence  which  leads  to  the  destruction  of  property  can  win  over  the
sympathy of the public, especially in the US where, as one commentator puts it, "private
property is God."65 These issues are central not only to the political foundations of global
activism, but also to its tactical and strategic efficiency. 
43 The  terrorist  attacks  of  11  September  2001  have  further  highlighted  the  crucial
relationship  between  violence and  dissent.  Consider  the  World  Economic  Forum  of
February 2002, which was held in New York rather than Davos. The significant presence
of protesters both in New York and at the alternative World Social Forum in Porto Alegre
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revealed that opposition to free-market oriented globalisation remains strong. But the
strategic dimensions of dissent have changed fundamentally. It would have been a major
public relations disaster for protesters to embark on a violent street fight with members
of the New York police, who are considered the heroes of 9.11. Many protest groups that
stress strict adherence to nonviolence thus stayed away from New York. And those that
went to Porto Alegre faced the challenge of articulating some sort of common manifesto,
one that seeks to articulate, as one commentator puts it, "a methodology of protest that
distinguishes  them  from  terrorists,  bloody  revolutionaries  and  bomb-throwing
malcontents."66
44 The prime challenge for  activists  now consists  of  attracting media attention without
resorting to violence, which ultimately undermines the ability to gain public support for
their cause. To do so successfully, the location of protest may well have to move away
from the major meetings of multilateral economic institutions. The risk that small acts of
violence undermine a large and carefully planned nonviolent protest may simply be too
high. Boycotts and innovative local actions, for instance, could prove to be more effective
locations for protest. They would not attract the same spectacular, but in the long run
such persistent  actions  may have more success  in influencing the value system that
sustains current practices of global economic governance. 
 
Conclusion : Democracy, Ambiguity and the Struggle
over Global Governance 
45 An extensive and broadly conceived engagement with political issues is crucial  if  the
global dissident movement is to contribute to the construction of a better world, rather
than merely oppose existing policies. To engage this problematique the present essay has
first demonstrated that globalisation does not necessarily, or at least not only, lead to a
centralisation of power and a corresponding loss of democratic participation and political
accountability. Taking the anti-WTO protest actions in Seattle as a case in point, the essay
has argued that globalisation has also increased the potential to engage in acts of dissent
that can subvert the very processes of control and homogenisation. In doing so, the essay
counters images of a hyperreal world, of an increasingly shallow and media dominated
globe in which nothing can penetrate beneath the surface. Political dissent, according to
this doomsday scenario, becomes all but impossible, for there is nothing left to dissent
against. There is only a twenty-for-hour-a-day-blur of information and entertainment.
We  are  caught  in  a  world  that  resembles  J.G.  Ballard's  Eden-Olympia :  a  financially
thriving  but  highly  unequal  high-tech  information  society,  seemingly  run  by  a  few
successful elites, but in reality spinning out of control and spiralling into an ever deeper
moral void, fed by the very need for progress and economic expansion.67
46 While engendering a series of problematic processes, globalisation has also increased the
possibility to engage political issues. Before the advent of speed, for instance, a protest
event  was  a  mostly  local  issue.  But  the  presence  of  global  media  networks  has
fundamentally changed the dynamics and terrains of dissent. Political activism no longer
takes place solely in the streets of Prague, Seoul or Asuncion. The Battle for Seattle, for
instance, was above all a media spectacle, a battle for the hearts and minds of global
television audiences. Political activism, wherever it occurs and whatever form it takes,
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has become intrinsically linked with the non-spatial logic of speed. It has turned into a
significant transnational phenomena. 
47 With the exploration of  new terrains of  dissent,  global  activists  also face a  series  of
political dilemmas. This essay has addressed two of them : the tension between violent
and nonviolent means of resistance, and the issue of unequal representation, the question
of who can speak for whom. Rather than suggesting that these issues can be understood
and solved by applying a pre-existing body of universal norms and principles, the essay
has drawn attention to the open-ended and contingent nature of the puzzles in question.
Protest acts against the key multilateral institutions of the world economy will continue,
and so will debates about the nature of globalisation and the methods of interfering with
its  governance.  Keeping these  debates  alive,  and seeking  to  include  as  many voices,
perspectives and constituencies as possible, is a first step towards something that may
one day resemble globalisation with a human face. 
48 But making global governance more humane, more transparent and more democratic is
no easy task. Principles of transparency and democracy have historically been confined to
the territorial boundaries of the sovereign nation state. Within these boundaries there is
the possibility for order and the rule of law. But the space beyond is seen as threatening
and anarchical  -  that is,  lacking a central  regulatory institution.  The standard realist
response to these perceptions is well know : protect sovereignty, order and civility at the
domestic level by promoting policies that maximise the state's military capacity and, so it
is  assumed,  its  security.68 It  is  questionable  to  what  extent  realist  policies  remain
adequate - and ethical for that matter - at a time when process of globalisation have lead
to a fundamental transformation of political dynamics. 
49 The Battle for Seattle, and the media spectacle that issued form it, may well demonstrate
that  the  struggle  for  power  takes  place  in  a  realm  that  lacks  a  central  regulatory
institution.  But  realist  interpretations make the mistake of  embarking on a fatalistic
interpretation of this political realm, constituting conflict as an inevitable element of the
system's  structure.  It  may  be  more  adequate  - and  certainly  more  productive  -  to
characterise  the  international  system  in  the  age  of  globalisation  and  transnational
dynamics not as anarchical, but as rhizomatic. For Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari a
rhizome is a multiplicity that has no coherent and bounded whole, no beginning or end,
only  a  middle  from  where  it  expands  and  overspills.  Any  point  of  the  rhizome  is
connected to any other. It has no fixed points to anchor thought, only lines, magnitudes,
dimensions, plateaus, and they are always in motion.69 How, then, is one to reach a moral
position in a world of webs, multitudes and multiplicities ? Are the lines, dimensions and
plateaus of the rhizome so randomly arranged that we are no longer able to generate the
kind of stable knowledge that is necessary to advance critique and, indeed, dissent ? Is the
very notion of political foundations still  possible at a time when social consciousness
gushes  out  of  five-second  sound-bites  and  the  corresponding  hyperreal  images  that
flicker over our television screens ?  Are there alternatives to realist  approaches that
protect domestic order by warding off everything that threatens it from the outside ?
Answers to such questions do, of course, not come easy. And they may not be uniform
either. But an adequate response will need to engage in one way or another with the
search for political engagements beyond the territorial boundaries of the nation state. 
50 An extension of democratic principles into the more ambiguous international realm is as
essential as it is difficult. It will need to be based on a commitment to democracy that
goes beyond the establishment of legal and institutional procedures. William Connolly
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has pointed in the right direction when arguing for a democratic ethos. The key to such
cultural democratisation, he believes, "is that it embodies a productive ambiguity at its
very centre, always resisting attempts to allow one side or the other to achieve final
victory."70 Such a model is,  of course, the antithesis of prevailing realist wisdom, and
perhaps of modern attitudes in general, which seek to achieve security and democracy
through the establishment of order and the repression of all ambiguity.71
51 Rather  than  posing  a  threat  to  human  security,  the  rhizomatic  dimension  of  the
international  system  may  well  be  a  crucial  element  in  the  attempt  to  establish  a
democratic  ethos  that  can  keep  up  with  the  pace  of  globalisation.  Some  aspects  of
democratic participation can never be institutionalised. Any political system, no matter
how just and refined, rests on a structure of exclusion. It  has to separate right from
wrong,  good  from evil,  moral  from immoral.  This  separation  is  both  inevitable  and
desirable.  But  to  remain  legitimate  the  respective  political  foundations  need  to  be
submitted to periodic scrutiny. They require constant readjustments in order to remain
adequate and fair. It is in the struggle for fairness, in the attempt to question established
norms and procedures, that global protest movements, problematic as they are at times,
make an indispensable contribution to democratic politics. 
52 The political significance of protest movments is located precisely in the fact that they
cannot be controlled by a central regulatory force or an institutional framework. They
open  up  possibilities  for  social  change  that  are  absent  within  the  context  of  the
established legal and political system.72 The various movements themselves are, of course,
far  from  unproblematic.  The  violent  nature  of  recent  actions  against  neo-liberal
governance  may  well  point  towards  the  need  for  greater  political  awareness  among
activists.  But  such  awareness  can  neither  be  imposed  by  legal  norms  or  political
procedures. It needs to emerge from the struggle over values that takes place in civil
society. The fact that this struggle is ongoing does not detract from the positive potential
that is hidden in the movement's rhizomatic nature. These elements embody the very
ideal of productive ambiguity that may well be essential for the long-term survival of
democracy. 
53 Forthcoming in Pacifica Review, 2002. 
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